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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

STRANGE JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC
DEFENDER FUNDING CRISIS: PUNISHING THE INNOCENT

SEAN D. O’BRIEN*
INTRODUCTION
I am grateful to have had one last opportunity to sit with Missouri Supreme
Court Judge Richard Teitelman at the 2016 Richard J. Childress Memorial
Lecture at Saint Louis University School of Law and listen to dedicated
advocates address problems and issues arising from the ongoing crisis in
Missouri indigent defense. 1
After the lecture, Judge Teitelman shared a personal story with former
Saint Louis University Law School Dean Michael Wolff, his former colleague
on the Supreme Court. Judge Teitelman authored the opinion that exonerated
and freed Joseph Amrine from death row based on newly discovered evidence
of his innocence, and Dean (then Judge) Wolff wrote a compelling
concurrence. 2 After his release from prison, Joe was invited to sit at the head
table for the Legal Aid of Western Missouri Justice for All Luncheon with
keynote speaker Sister Helen Prejean and dignitaries that included Judge
Teitelman and his fellow Missouri Supreme Court Judge Ray Price. Judge
Teitelman was overjoyed to meet Joe, and, as he did with everyone, asked Joe
to call him “Rick.” After lunch, Judge Teitelman insisted that Joe pose for a
picture with him and Judge Price, who had dissented in part from the decision
granting Joe habeas corpus relief. Joe stood with a Supreme Court judge under
each arm, and just before the shutter clicked, he said, “Wait ‘til the guys back
on death row see this.” Judge Teitelman laughed as hard telling the story as he

* Sean O’Brien is a Professor at University of Missouri - Kansas City School of Law, where he
teaches criminal law and procedure. He served as the former Jackson County Public Defender
from 1985–1990 and was a founding board member of the Midwest Innocence Project.
1. Presenters included ArchCity Defenders Co-Founder and Executive Director Thomas
Harvey, Co-Founder and Director of Finance and Operations Michael-John Voss, and Staff
Attorney and Skadden Fellow Blake Strode; Stephen Bright, President of the Southern Center for
Human Rights; Missouri State Public Defender Michael Barrett; and the newly elected St. Louis
City Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner. Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture 2016: Indigence and
the Criminal Justice System, St. Louis University School of Law (Oct. 7, 2016), http://law.slu.
edu/childresslecture2016 [http://perma.cc/Z8UV-8AUZ]. All had insightful views on the
problems facing indigent defendants in Missouri.
2. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543–44 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
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did when it happened. Judge Teitelman’s recognition of Joe Amrine’s
humanity on and off the bench exemplifies who he was as a jurist and as a
human being. He treated everyone with dignity, respect, and good humor. He
will be sorely missed. It is timely for this article to recall his significant
contributions to the protection of innocent prisoners who have not been well
served by Missouri’s indigent defense system.
Judge Teitelman’s decision that freed Joe Amrine is a good lens through
which to view Missouri’s chronic indigent defense crisis. Joe is one of thirtyeight innocent people in Missouri since 1989 to be wrongly convicted of
serious crimes and later cleared by new evidence. 3 Collectively, these men and
women have served nearly a thousand years of unjust incarceration in Missouri
prisons. Not every Missouri miscarriage of justice reported on the National
Registry of Exonerations was defended by a public defender, and not every
wrongful conviction is caused by defense attorney error. The Registry
identifies inadequate legal defense as the cause of nearly one in four of these
cases. However, systemic deficiencies such as those found to exist in the
Missouri Public Defender System are undoubtedly contributing factors in
many cases. 4 After all, the Sixth Amendment “envisions counsel’s playing a

3. The National Registry of Exonerations is a joint project of the University of California
Irvine Newkirk Center for Science and Society, University of Michigan Law School and
Michigan State University College of Law that tracks cases of exonerations in the United States
since 1989. To be included in the registry, a person must have been “convicted of a crime and
later was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency with the
authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal
conviction by a government official or body with the authority to take that action.” Glossary, THE
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
glossary.aspx [http://perma.cc/GCY4-3V84]. Missouri prisoners on the registry and the years
they served include George Allen, Jr., thirty-two years; Joseph Amrine, seventeen years on death
row; Antonio Beaver, seventeen years; James Bowman, fifteen years; Johnny Briscoe, twentythree years; Richard Buchli II, ten years; Darryl Burton, twenty-four years; David Clay, Sr., nine
years; Eric Clemmons, fourteen years on death row; Clarence Richard Dexter, Jr., eight years on
death row; Donald Dixon, sixteen years; Gary Engle, twenty years; Lonnie Erby, seventeen years;
Russell Faria, two years; Ryan Ferguson, ten years; Reginald Griffin, fifteen years; Jennifer Hall,
four years; Paula Hall, four years; Dale Helmig, fifteen years; Larry Johnson, eighteen years;
Joshua Kezer, fourteen years; Ernest Leap, fourteen years; Cornell McKay, two years; Robert
Nelson, nineteen years; Ellen Reasonover, sixteen years; George Revelle, two years; Jon Keith
Smith, thirteen years; Patricia Stallings, one year; Zackary Lee Stewart, two years; James
Strughold, two years; Antoine Terry, two years; Steven Toney, fourteen years; Armand Villasana,
one year; Theodore White, Jr., seven years; Johnny Lee Wilson, ten years; Anthony D. Woods,
eighteen years; Mark Woodworth, nineteen years; and Kenneth York, six years. See The NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
browse.aspx [http://perma.cc/GPG6-3MB9] (filtered by jurisdiction).
4. See Sean D. O’Brien, Missouri’s Public Defender Crisis: Shouldering the Burden Alone,
75 MO. L. REV. 853, 857 (2010) (reviewing the history of the Missouri Public Defender System,
which was created in 1973, ten full years after Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
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role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results.” 5 It is impossible to know how many of the other miscarriages of
justice caused by mistaken identification, false confessions, misleading
forensic evidence, or official misconduct might have been prevented by a
vigorous defense. But the innocence phenomenon, which saw a record number
of exonerations in 2015, 6 provides an important backdrop to the examination
of Missouri’s indigent defense funding crisis.
I. INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER CRISIS
Judges, journalists, scholars, and Missouri Bar presidents have written
much about Missouri’s chronic indigent defense crisis, all urging more money,
more lawyers, more training, more resources. 7 Few, however, consider what a
system in crisis looks like from the client’s perspective. The most thorough
assessment came from the late Robert Spangenberg, one of the foremost
experts in the United States on indigent defense systems. In a study
commissioned by the Missouri Bar, Spangenberg called the Missouri Public
Defender System’s caseload crisis “one of the worst of its kind in the nation,”
and said the system was “on the brink of collapse,” providing only “the illusion
of a lawyer.” 8 New lawyers receive “little hands-on supervision,” and judges

mandated the appointment of counsel for all persons accused of felony offenses, and which has
been chronically underfunded since its inception).
5. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
6. THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, at 3 (Feb. 3, 2016),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/2Q5F-UYRJ].
7. See Douglas A. Copeland, The President’s Page: Missouri’s Public Defender System, 62
J. MO. B. 10, 10–11 (2006); Laura Denvir Stith, Chief Justice Delivers 2009 State of the
Judiciary Address, 65 J. MO. B. 62, 63–64 (2009); James McKay, The Bar Speaks, 62 J. MO. B.
162, 162 (2006); Bill McClellan, Reasonover Win of Lawsuit Raises Some Old Questions, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2004, at B1; CATHLEEN BURNETT, JUSTICE DENIED:
CLEMENCY APPEALS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 63–99 (2002).
8. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP & THE CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEO. MASON
U., ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM 64, 66 (2009), www.nla
da.net/sites/default/files/2009%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Missouri%20State%20Public%
20Defender%20System%20(TSG).pdf [http://perma.cc/ED6Y-2UJH] [hereinafter SPANGENBERG
ASSESSMENT]. The Spangenberg Assessment was criticized for not arriving at specific caseload
and funding projections. Allison Retka, Missouri State Public Defender System Study Criticized
as Inadequate, MO. LAW. MEDIA, Nov. 23, 2009. Spangenberg, on the other hand, cautioned that
“the results only provide an accurate description of a system in crisis. Any reliance on these
numbers, even as a baseline from which to develop appropriate caseload standards, would only
serve to institutionalize an already crippled system.” SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT at 41. The
Spangenberg Group concluded that the Missouri Public Defender System is “the most poorly
funded of all the state public defender systems in the country.” Id. at 33. Because the system is so
underfunded, Spangenberg recommended adding substantial new resources and support staff
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expressed concerns that high turnover results in new attorneys handling a
significant caseload of serious cases for which they were simply not ready. 9
This produces “a crop of attorneys faced with crushing caseloads who ‘do not
know what effective representation is’ due to a crippling lack of experience
and supervision.” 10 Defenders described a system of triage in which some
clients were neglected in order to adequately defend others. 11 Violations of
performance and ethical standards were institutionalized; the practice of “meet
’em and plead ’em” was not only commonplace but expected. 12 In 2009,
Missouri public defenders could only spend an average of 7.7 hours on each
case, including death penalty cases. 13 To cope with staggering law school debt
and low salaries, some defenders work second jobs delivering pizza, working
retail, tending bar, or driving trucks. 14 It is doubtful that clients are consistently
getting quality representation under these conditions.
II. GUTTING THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE SAFETY NET: THE JOSEPH AMRINE
CASE
Few would dispute the proposition that the execution or incarceration of an
innocent person is the definitive failure of the criminal justice system.
Certainly, it fails in other ways; defense attorney error and prosecutorial
misconduct are serious problems that contribute to unfair sentences, erosion of
constitutional rights, and public disrespect for the justice system. 15 While there
is argument about the extent of these problems, no one would seriously suggest
that innocence is irrelevant. In examining the Missouri defender system,
conviction of the innocent is the canary in the coal mine. It happens all too
often, but the judicial safety net is not what it should be in a jurisdiction with a
chronically underfunded indigent defense system. Few prisoners have adequate
resources to overcome daunting hurdles to proving their innocence. 16
before attempting to assess resource and workload issues necessary for adequate representation.
Id. at 46, 52.
9. SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 6–7.
10. Id. at 30.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 23.
13. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Mo. 2009) (en
banc).
14. SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 15.
15. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), http://www.a
mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_
right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q29H-ZK7Z].
16. Successful exoneration efforts in Missouri invariably require the generosity of counsel
who undertake massive pro bono effort to sift through mountains of documents and fund
extensive investigation into the charges against the client. For prisoners seeking relief from unjust
convictions, finding such a lawyer is like winning the lottery. Examples include Robert Ramsey
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Joseph Amrine’s experience illustrates Spangenberg’s findings. In his
wrongful conviction for the murder of Gary Barber in the Missouri
Penitentiary in 1985, Amrine was defended by Cole County Public Defender
Julian Ossman, whose incompetence in the defense of prisoners facing the
death penalty has been written about by legal scholars. 17 Amrine is the second
of Ossman’s clients to be sentenced to death and then exonerated after many
years on Missouri’s death row. 18 In two other death penalty cases, courts found
Ossman constitutionally ineffective, but those judgments were set aside
because of procedural technicalities created by deficient representation on the
part of public defenders in subsequent appeals, and those clients were put to
death both because of and in spite of incompetent representation. 19 In yet
another case, the issue of Ossman’s deficient performance was procedurally
barred by the inept performance of his public defenders appointed to represent

and Michelle Puckett’s tireless work that freed Mark Woodworth, State ex rel. Woodworth v.
Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); years of pro bono work by Cheryl Pilate on
behalf of Daryl Burton, Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CC00312 (Cole Cty., filed Aug. 18, 2008);
the generosity of Kansas City mortgage banker James B. Nutter, Jr., who funded much of the
author’s expenses incurred in Joseph Amrine’s exoneration, State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102
S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); and the work of Charles Weiss and his firm, Bryan Cave,
that proved the innocence of Josh Kezer, Kezer v. Dormire, No. 08AC-CC00293 (Cole Cty., filed
Feb. 17, 2009). These efforts are now supplemented by the support of the Cardozo Innocence
Project, who worked with Bryan Cave in the exoneration of George Allen, State ex rel. Koster v.
Green, 388 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), and the Midwest Innocence Project, operating in
conjunction with the University of Missouri-Kansas City and University of Missouri Law School
Wrongful Convictions Clinics to assist the author and Kansas City attorney Bronwyn Werner in
the exoneration of Dale Helmig. State ex rel. Koster v. McElwain, 340 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2011), and to assist Illinois attorney Kathleen Zelner in the exoneration of Ryan Ferguson.
Ferguson v. Dormire, 413 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). The vast resources, generosity and
dedication of these organizations, law firms, and attorneys is but a drop in the bucket in
relationship to the need. The Midwest Innocence Project, with a staff of two lawyers, currently
has over six hundred pending requests for assistance. See MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT,
TheMIP.org/about [http://perma.cc/V9MU-WVDJ].
17. See WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN
CAPITAL CASES 186–87 (2006) [hereinafter WHITE, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS] (discussing in detail
Ossman’s deficient defense of Ricky Zeitvogel who was executed in Missouri on December 11,
1996); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SEARCHABLE EXECUTION DATABASE,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions [http://perma.cc/DKS2-WMYX] [hereinafter
DPIC DATABASE].
18. See Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 956 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting Eric Clemmons a
new trial because of Ossman’s deficient performance, and acquitting him). See THE NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, ERIC CLEMMONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera
tion/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3110 [http://perma.cc/U3NB-UMDN].
19. Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1039 (8th Cir. 1995); Bolder v. Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359,
1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1990). Emmet Nave was executed on July 31, 1996; Martsay Bolder was
executed on Jan. 27, 1993. DPIC DATABASE, supra note 17.
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him on his post-conviction motion. 20 Amrine himself came perilously close to
execution because of similar neglect by Ossman and public defenders who
represented him in subsequent state post-conviction proceedings.
One of the obstacles facing people in Joe Amrine’s situation is the lack of
teeth in the Strickland v. Washington 21 standard for proving that trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective. The late Professor Welsh S. White noted that
under Strickland, it has become “increasingly clear that defense attorneys’
representation of capital defendants was sometimes shockingly inadequate.” 22
The American Bar Association found that Strickland failed to protect against
widespread problems with legal services for indigent defendants, even in death
penalty cases. 23 Professor White criticized Strickland for permitting courts to
affirm unjust convictions and sentences based on trial counsel’s weak claims of
“trial strategy,” and for allowing subjective determinations that the prisoner
has not met his burden of proving that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
deficient performance. 24 Another major obstacle to enforcing the right to
competent counsel is the lack of effective post-conviction counsel to
investigate and develop claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 25 So
Joe Amrine’s burden of proving that Ossman’s performance was
constitutionally deficient was formidable, notwithstanding Ossman’s abysmal
track record.
Ossman’s conduct of Amrine’s defense is consistent in every way with
Spangenberg’s description of a system in crisis. What little investigation he
conducted was untimely; Ossman interviewed defense witnesses for the first
time in the hallway during the trial with the jury waiting in the box.26 He did

20. Zeitvogel v. Delo, 84 F.3d 276, 278, 281 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing habeas corpus review
because “the blame for Zeitvogel’s procedural default falls squarely on Zeitvogel’s
postconviction counsel”).
21. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
22. WHITE, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, supra note 17, at 3. Professor White found cases in
which trial counsel who were in the parking lot while the key prosecution witness was on the
stand, who referred to an African-American client as “nigger,” or who stipulated to all of the
elements of first degree murder plus two aggravating circumstances were constitutionally
adequate under Strickland. Id.
23. See Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 13, 16 (1990)
24. WHITE, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, supra note 17, at 17–19.
25. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
174, 185 (2011); cf., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
26. When defense witness Brian Strothers came to court, Ossman asked the trial court to
wait while he told Strothers why he was subpoenaed to the courthouse. Ossman admitted, “I’ve
never talked to this guy before.” Transcript of Record at 627, Amrine v. Ossman, No. 08ACCC00340, at 627 (Cole Cty., Nov. 5, 2012).
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not object to Amrine being displayed to the jury in shackles and leg irons. 27
Ossman did not object when State’s witness Terry Russell blurted out, falsely,
that he had passed a polygraph test. 28 He failed to cross-examine jailhouse
informants about glaring inconsistencies in their stories. 29 He did nothing to
prepare for the penalty phase of trial; Joe Amrine’s mother first learned of the
trial when she read about her son’s death sentence in the newspaper. Although
the federal court “agree[d] with the district court that Amrine’s counsel did not
fulfill his obligation to investigate adequately,” consistent with Professor
White’s criticism of Strickland, the court concluded, “Nevertheless, Amrine
has not shown that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient
performance.” 30 Amrine’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
denied because he could not establish, to the court’s satisfaction, “a reasonable
probability that, absent [the counsel’s unprofessional] errors, the factfinder
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” 31 In hindsight, it can be
said with certainty that Strickland failed to protect an innocent person from a
concededly incompetent lawyer. The Strickland standard has offered indigent
defendants little protection at all against Ossman’s serial incompetence.
As Amrine’s appeals were moving through the court system, the jailhouse
informants who testified against him recanted their testimony one by one. The
first recantation by Randy Ferguson was rejected because the other two, Terry
Russell and Jerry Poe, stood by their stories. 32 Russell’s subsequent recantation
was also rejected as not credible, and Poe’s trial testimony stood
unimpeached. 33 During Amrine’s appeal from the denial of his federal habeas
petition, Poe was finally located, and he admitted that his trial testimony

27. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Amrine I]. Cf.
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005).
28. Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
29. State’s witness, Jerry Poe, told investigators that he saw Amrine sneak up behind Gary
Barber, stab him in the back, and run away with the knife in his hand. Amrine v. Bowersox, 238
F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Amrine II]. State’s witness Randy Ferguson testified
that Amrine and Barber were walking side-by-side, talking to one another, when Amrine pulled a
knife from his waistband and stabbed Barber, leaving the knife in Barber’s back as he ran away.
Id. The jury heard only Ferguson’s version of events. Id.
30. Id. at 1031.
31. Id. at 1030 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
32. State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665, 675 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
33. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Shortly after his
testimony against Amrine, Russell was released from prison and was returned to prison a few
months later on a conviction for murder. Id. at 1224 n.6. Amrine’s new evidence implicated
Russell in Barber’s murder. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc). Judge Wolff observed that Russell was never a good witness for either side. “The question
is: which time were these three witnesses lying? When they testified against Amrine, or when
they recanted? . . . . What we do know is that all three witnesses—upon whom Amrine’s
conviction and sentence of death solely depend—are liars.” Id at 550 (Wolff, J., concurring).
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implicating Amrine was false. Amrine’s case was remanded for a hearing on
Amrine’s claim of actual innocence. 34
III. INNOCENCE AS A GATEWAY THROUGH PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES
Courts have historically constrained the litigation of innocence to the trial
of the case, heeding Justice Rehnquist’s philosophy that the trial is the main
event:
To the greatest extent possible all issues which bear on this charge should be
determined [at trial]: the accused is in the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the
judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly
sworn, await their turn to testify. Society’s resources have been concentrated at
that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the
35
question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.

Consistent with that philosophy, state and federal courts have limited the postconviction litigation of innocence to narrow circumstances. The problem in
Missouri, of course, is that society’s resources have not been concentrated at
the time and place of trial, at least not as far as the defendant is concerned.
Tensions between federal and state sovereignty have spawned a complex,
arcane system of procedural technicalities that enable courts to avoid deciding
a prisoner’s imperfectly litigated constitutional claims. However, the Supreme
Court made clear in 1963 that procedural bars must give way when “the ends
of justice” require it. 36 Thirty-two years later, the Court used a Missouri case
alleging ineffective assistance of appointed counsel to find the “ends of
justice” test satisfied by a colorable claim of actual innocence. In Schlup v.
Delo, trial counsel assigned by the public defender to defend Schlup did not
speak to multiple witnesses known to have seen a murder. 37 However, as in
Amrine, post-conviction counsel did not perform the investigation that trial
counsel had failed to do, so Lloyd Schlup’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel arrived in federal court procedurally encumbered and without facts to
support it. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Schlup’s habeas
corpus petition, effectively “tell[ing] Lloyd Schlup in regard to his conviction:
You may indeed be innocent, but you are not innocent enough early enough.” 38
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s
judgment denying habeas corpus review to Lloyd Schlup, creating what is now
known as the “gateway” claim of actual innocence: even if a prisoner’s
constitutional claims are procedurally barred, if “it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Amrine I, 128 F.3d at 1230.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 307 (1995).
Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 754 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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evidence,” then the federal court “cannot have confidence in the outcome of
the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless
constitutional error.” 39 Schlup’s case was remanded and resolved in a two-step
process consistent with the Court’s ruling: First, Eastern District of Missouri
Presiding Judge Jean Hamilton, after a hearing, determined that Schlup’s new
evidence showed a reasonable probability that no reasonable juror would find
him guilty. 40 However, the inquiry could not end there; that finding only
permitted Judge Hamilton to determine whether Schlup’s trial was free of
harmful constitutional error. At a second hearing, Judge Hamilton found that
Schlup’s appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to interview known
eyewitnesses to the crime, and issued the writ of habeas corpus. 41 This
illustrates the operation of Schlup’s innocence gateway to habeas corpus relief,
which, has led to the release of other Missouri prisoners who were convicted,
in spite of innocence, after unconstitutional trials. 42 The Schlup doctrine is
grounded in the principle that habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, and “the
ultimate equity on the prisoner’s side [is] a sufficient showing of actual
innocence.” 43
A safety net for innocent prisoners is indisputably necessary in a state with
a chronically underfunded public defender system. Unfortunately, the safety
net is full of holes. Proof of a reasonable probability of innocence is a high
threshold, reserved for “highly unusual case[s].” 44 Even if the prisoner can
meet the innocence threshold, the toothless Strickland standard still stands in
the way. One would think that a person who was convicted in spite of
innocence could show that he or she had an unfair trial, but that is not always
the case. The low threshold for adequate performance and the high threshold
for showing prejudice has obstructed the release of prisoners like Amrine who
could prove their innocence. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that Daryl Burton was probably innocent, but under Strickland’s
subjective standard the court felt compelled to find that he had a fair trial. The
court wrote, “Burton’s habeas petition troubles us because his legal claims do

39. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, 327.
40. Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 455 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
41. Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV443 JCH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8887, at *45 (E.D.
Mo. May 2, 1996).
42. See, e.g., Reasonover v. Washington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 937, 981 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Kezer v.
Dormire, No. 08AC-CC00293, at *44–45 (Cole Cty., filed Feb. 17, 2009); Burton v. Dormire,
No. 06AC-CC00312, at *42 (Cole Cty., filed Aug. 18, 2008).
43. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
44. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 341–42.
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not provide him an adequate foundation upon which to present his considerable
claims of factual innocence.” 45
The Eighth Circuit in subsequent decisions has rendered Schlup incapable
of reaching a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Amrine I, the court
put a gloss on Schlup’s innocence gateway that requires the prisoner to come
forward with “new” evidence, and “[t]he evidence is new only if it was not
available at trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the
exercise of due diligence.” 46 The court drew the “due diligence” requirement
from earlier decisions addressing substantive claims based only on freestanding claims of newly discovered evidence. 47 In Ellen Reasonover’s case,
Judge Jean Hamilton provided a hypothetical to explain the absurdity of
Amrine’s rule:
A habeas petitioner presents a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which
is procedurally barred. The petitioner is unable to establish cause and
prejudice. The petitioner presents compelling evidence of actual innocence, but
all the evidence was available at the time of trial and could have been
discovered in the exercise of due diligence. Further, petitioner presents
evidence that the available evidence was not utilized because of trial counsel’s
lack of diligence.
Under the Eighth Circuit’s definition of new evidence, the petitioner’s Schlup
claim must fail, notwithstanding the compelling evidence of actual innocence.
Under Amrine, the evidence presented by the petitioner is not “new,” and
therefore may not be considered by the habeas court. The petitioner’s claim
would be procedurally barred, and the habeas court would be precluded from
ruling on the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In contrast, under Schlup, the evidence presented by the petitioner is “new”
because it was “not presented at trial.” Assuming that the new evidence is
reliable and sufficient to sustain the petitioner’s burden under Schlup, the
habeas court must consider the merits of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance

45. Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2002). The court “express[ed] the hope
that the state of Missouri may provide a forum (either judicial or executive) in which to consider
the mounting evidence that Burton’s conviction was procured by perjured or flawed eyewitness
testimony.” Id. Burton was ultimately freed, but only after the Eighth Circuit’s timid ruling cost
an innocent man an additional six years of his life. Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CC00312, at
*42–43 (Cole Cty., filed Aug. 18, 2008). Ironically, Burton was found innocent and released by
Cole County Circuit Judge Richard Callahan, the same man who had prosecuted Lloyd Schlup.
Id.
46. Amrine I, 128 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis added).
47. Id. (citing Bannister, 100 F.3d at 610, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) and Smith v. Armontrout, 888
F.2d 530, 542 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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of counsel claim because failure to do so would result in a “fundamental
48
miscarriage of justice.”

Judge Hamilton noted that in Schlup itself, the Supreme Court
characterized witness testimony as “‘new statements,’ even though the
information in those statements was available at the time of trial and could
have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.” 49 Thus, the outcome in
Schlup itself would have been different if the Eighth Circuit standard was
correct. Because the Court clearly intended actual innocence to prevent legal
technicalities from obstructing remedies for constitutional violations that
render a conviction unworthy of confidence, no other circuit in the county
follows the Eighth Circuit’s Amrine standard. 50
Judge Hamilton’s warning has come to fruition in subsequent cases in
which the Eighth Circuit has allowed trial counsel’s ineffectiveness to defeat a
gateway innocence claim where actual innocence is asserted to reach a
procedurally barred claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ricky Kidd
alleged that his Missouri public defender was ineffective for failing to
investigate and present evidence that he was innocent; public defenders
assigned to represent him on appeal and post-conviction did not investigate
Mr. Kidd’s innocence, and abandoned Mr. Kidd’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The only path to prove that Missouri violated Kidd’s
constitutional right to counsel was through Schlup’s innocence gateway—a
door that the Eighth Circuit firmly slammed shut in Kidd’s face. 51
Kidd was charged with the homicides of George Bryant and Oscar Bridges
that occurred in broad daylight and was witnessed by neighbors who saw three
men get in a new, white Oldsmobile and flee the scene. 52 The police
investigation produced air fare, hotel and car rental records showing that three

48. Reasonover v. Washington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 937, 949–50 n.8 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (internal
citations omitted). Ellen Reasonover was freed after sixteen years of wrongful imprisonment
because she invoked the Schlup gateway to reach a defaulted claim that the Missouri concealed
exonerating evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Ellen
Reasonover, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ex
oneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3564 [https://perma.cc/YL8P-YVY9].
49. Reasonover, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 948–49. Fortunately for Ellen Reasonover, “[t]he
evidence which was available, but not presented at trial, . . . strengthens, but is not essential to,
Petitioner’s successful showing of actual innocence.” Id., at 950.
50. Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t would defy reason to block
review of actual innocence based on what could later amount to the counsel’s constitutionally
defective representation.”); Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 94 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“the rule that
Amrine sets forth requires a petitioner, such as Houck, in effect to contend that his trial counsel
was not ineffective because otherwise the newly presented evidence cannot be new, reliable
evidence for Schlup purposes”). See also Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961–62 (9th Cir.
2003).
51. Kidd v. Norman, 651 F.3d 947, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2011).
52. Id. at 948, 951.
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men, Marcus Merrill, Gary Goodspeed, Sr., and Gary Goodspeed, Jr., all
related to one another, flew from Atlanta to Kansas City a few days before the
murder, rented a car matching the description of the getaway car, rendezvoused
at the Adam’s Mark Hotel the morning of the crime, and returned to Atlanta a
few days later. 53 All three gave statements placing themselves in one another’s
company, with no third party alibi, at the time of the offense. 54 None
mentioned Ricky Kidd. 55 No documentary or physical evidence implicated
Kidd in the crime, and his shoes were excluded as the source of a bloody
footprint on the victims’ kitchen floor. 56 The only evidence against Kidd at
trial was Richard Harris, who portrayed himself as a neighbor who happened to
walk past the house as the homicide was taking place. 57 Harris identified Kidd
as the shooter and Gary Goodspeed, Jr., as an accomplice. 58 Curiously,
Goodspeed was never charged.
The Spangenberg assessment noted that one of the many detrimental
effects of the public defender funding crisis is that “[w]ork on some cases
would not begin until the trial date was near.” 59 The failure of Kidd’s alibi
defense reveals why and how procrastination in the defense preparation harms
public defender clients. When questioned separately eight days after the crime,
Kidd and his girlfriend said that they were together all day on February 6,
1996. 60 They drove downtown to collect Kidd’s car keys form his sister at her
employer’s, and then went to the Sheriff’s Department to register a handgun. 61
Police obtained the gun permit application, which was dated February 6,
1996. 62 Kidd was released pending further investigation, and was charged
three months later. Kidd’s public defender did not preserve video footage from
the employer’s surveillance cameras, and waited over a year to talk to alibi
witnesses. 63 Nor did she attempt to interview the deputy who placed her badge
number on Kidd’s gun permit application. 64 Consequently, the unimpeachable,
irrefutable portions of Kidd’s alibi were lost to time.
The public defender’s procrastination exposed Kidd’s alibi witnesses to
avoidable attack: Kidd’s sister could not remember a year later whether she

53. Id. at 951.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Exhibits in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 650, In re Kidd v. Conlee,
No. 1516-CV05073 (Jackson Cty., Mar. 6, 2015).
57. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 948.
58. Id.
59. SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 8.
60. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 948.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 951.
64. Id.
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took the bus home from work that day, or her brother gave her a ride.65
Another witness who was not interviewed for a year was questioned how she
could possibly remember the date a year later. 66 Frustrated that his lawyer was
not preserving his alibi, Kidd called witnesses himself from the county jail, and
those witnesses were challenged for colluding with Kidd. 67 The prosecutor
claimed the sheriff’s gun permit could have been received by mail. 68 The case
is a compelling demonstration of the inability of an overburdened public
defender system to develop and present a truthful defense. Even if Kidd’s
family and his sister’s coworkers were telling the truth, their credibility could
not withstand the attacks occasioned by the public defender’s delay. In
essence, Missouri prosecutions may be alibi-proof if the defendant is
represented by an overburdened public defender.
Kidd’s habeas counsel developed significant evidence to support a claim of
actual innocence as a gateway to Kidd’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel that was procedurally barred when his post-conviction lawyers did no
investigation. The testimony of the deputy who processed Kidd’s gun permit
“confirmed Kidd’s application was received the same day as the shootings.” 69
He also developed substantial evidence impeaching Richard Harris, the only
witness who tied Kidd to the crime:
This evidence includes Harris’s drug connections to Bryant, his use of
marijuana at the time of the shootings, the inconsistencies between Harris’s
description of the shooter’s appearance (the shooter “had a head of hair” and
“wasn’t bald-headed at the time”) and Kidd’s appearance (it is undisputed
Kidd’s head was shaved completely bald at the time of the shootings), and the
inconsistencies between Harris’s description of the shootings and other
70
eyewitnesses who did not see Harris outside Bryant’s home at the time.

Habeas counsel also established that “Harris frequently used drugs with
Bryant, and Harris was upset with Bryant because Bryant wanted to kill
Harris’s best friend.” 71 Habeas counsel produced another witness, Eugene
Williams, who “place[d] Merrill and the two Goodspeeds together the morning
of the shootings.” 72 The Court further noted that “Williams also connect[ed]
Merrill and the Goodspeeds to the weapons used in the murders, and knew the
three men were going to rob someone that morning.” 73 Finally, Marcus Merrill
65. Transcript on Appeal at 1148, State v. Kidd, No. CR96-2137 (Jackson Cty., filed Dec. 2
1997) (on file with the author).
66. Id. at 1169–70.
67. Id. at 1182.
68. Id. at 1164–65.
69. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 951.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 950.
72. Id. at 951.
73. Id.
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testified that he committed the robbery along with the Goodspeeds, and Kidd
was not involved in the crime at all. 74
Even though new evidence proved that the state’s main witness was
unbelievable, that Kidd’s alibi was truthful, and established the identity of the
real killers, Kidd could not satisfy the Eighth Circuit’s impossible
interpretation of the Schlup standard. The court acknowledged that “Amrine
has been criticized when the procedurally defaulted claim which a petitioner
hopes to resurrect under Schlup is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
against trial counsel for not discovering and presenting the exculpatory
evidence that proves the petitioner’s innocence.” 75 Nevertheless, the court held
that “the district court correctly interpreted Amrine as requiring Kidd to come
forward not only with new reliable evidence which was not presented at trial,
but to come forward with new reliable evidence which was not available at
trial through the exercise of due diligence.” 76 As long as Amrine’s holding
persists, federal habeas corpus offers no protection to innocent public defender
clients who are convicted because of incompetent defense.
IV. IS INNOCENCE AN ADEQUATE REASON TO RELEASE A PRISONER?
Exonerations based on DNA evidence provide a rich pool of reliable data
about causes of wrongful convictions. To no one’s surprise, the type of
evidence that correlates most strongly with the conviction of innocent
defendants is eyewitness identification testimony. 77 What should a court do if a
conviction is grounded on an honest but mistaken eyewitness identification
that is credited by a jury at a trial that is otherwise “fair?” Is there a remedy for
that prisoner? That issue is on its way to the Missouri Supreme Court in the
case of Rodney Lincoln. 78 First, a little history.
As Lloyd Schlup’s habeas corpus petition was percolating through the
federal system, Leonel Herrera was attempting to use lingering doubts about

74. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 949. Merrill’s testimony was discounted by the court because of
Merrill’s hope that cooperation with the prosecution could reduce his life sentence. Id. at 950.
75. Id. at 952.
76. Id. at 953. The flaw in the Eighth Circuit’s Amrine actual innocence standard should
have been clear in Amrine itself, where the Missouri Supreme Court found that the evidence
which the Eighth Circuit refused to consider “met [Amrine’s] burden of providing clear and
convincing evidence of actual innocence that undermines our confidence in the correctness of the
judgment.” State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
77. According to the Innocence Project, “Eyewitness misidentification is the greatest
contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing, playing a role in more than
70% of convictions overturned through DNA testing nationwide.” Eyewitness Misidentification,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/eyewitness-misidentification/
[http://perma.cc/NDH5-V2H2].
78. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, WD79854, 2016 WL 5888944, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2016).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882973

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

STRANGE JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS

739

his guilt to prevent his impending execution in Texas. Unlike Schlup, all of
Herrera’s constitutional issues had been ruled against him; innocence was all
he had left. Herrera was scheduled to be executed February 19, 1992, 79 and
Schlup was scheduled to be executed in March 1992. 80 Schlup’s stay of
execution came from the lower courts to sort out his gateway claim of
innocence, and Herrera’s stay came after the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether it violated the Eighth Amendment to execute an innocent
person. 81 Herrera’s claim of innocence was not as strong as Schlup’s, but it
was nevertheless plausible. 82 Since the rejection of Herrera’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and other trial error had already been rejected,
the viability of his innocence claim was the sole remaining issue.
The Court did not look kindly upon Herrera’s innocence evidence, but did
not close the door on a sufficiently meritorious innocence claim in the future.
No single rationale carried a majority of the Court. Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justices Stevens and Souter, would have remanded the case for a hearing on
whether Herrera could “show that he probably is innocent.” 83 Justice White
would grant relief in such cases if the prisoner’s evidence shows that “no
rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 84
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, disagreed, asserting
that “[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an
independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding.” 85
Somewhere in the middle of this three-to-one-to-three division, Justice
O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, acknowledged that “the execution of a
legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable
event[;]” however, Herrera was “not innocent, in any sense of the word.” 86
Therefore, she concluded:
[T]he Court has no reason to pass on, and appropriately reserves, the question
whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of actual innocence.

79. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1030 (5th Cir. 1992).
80. Sean O’Brien, Mothers and Sons: The Lloyd Schlup Story, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1021,
1031–32 (2009).
81. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
82. Herrera’s innocence evidence included an affidavit of an attorney that Herrera’s brother
Raul, who died in 1984, had admitted that he, not Leonel Herrera, was the killer. Also, Raul
Herrera’s cell mate submitted an affidavit that Raul Herrera had confessed to him as well.
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 396.
83. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324
(1979)).
85. Id. at 400.
86. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882973

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

740

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:725

That difficult question remains open. If the Constitution’s guarantees of fair
procedure and the safeguards of clemency and pardon fulfill their historical
87
mission, it may never require resolution at all.

The State of Texas executed Leonel Herrera on May 12, 1993. 88
Missouri’s dysfunctional defender system provides the perfect soup for the
scenario that Justice O’Connor described: the Constitution’s guarantees of fair
procedure and safeguards of clemency and pardon do not fulfill their historical
mission. Amrine was the first post-Herrera test of Missouri courts’ power to
correct the conviction of an innocent person. After the federal courts refused to
consider the bulk of the evidence supporting his innocence and rejected his
Schlup gateway claim of actual innocence, Joe Amrine petitioned the Missouri
Supreme Court for habeas corpus relief, asserting a free-standing claim of
actual innocence. Predictably, the State “asserted in its brief, and in oral
argument, that Mr. Amrine had no right to additional review, whatever the
nature of his current claims and whatever the strength of the evidence
supporting them.” 89 At the oral argument of Amrine’s case, Missouri Supreme
Court Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith asked counsel for the State, “Are you
suggesting, . . . even if we find that Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he should
be executed?” 90 The Assistant Attorney General answered, “That’s correct,
your honor.” 91 Judge Stith later wrote that even though commentators were
shocked at this answer,
I was not. That was the only answer he could give in light of the legal position
taken by the State of Missouri in opposing Mr. Amrine’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus. If a state high court has no authority to review a claim of actual
innocence, then it follows that it is powerless to prevent the prisoner’s
92
execution.

87. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427. After Herrera, the Court stayed the execution of Troy Davis
and ordered a hearing on his innocence claim. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009). Davis was
executed, amid great controversy, after a federal judge concluded that Davis’ evidence was not
sufficiently persuasive. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010). See Kim Severson, Davis Is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/us/final-pleas-and-vigils-in-troy-davis-execution.html
[http://perma.cc/WW76-Y6WD]. The Court continues to assume, for the sake of argument, that a
prisoner who received a fair trial could nevertheless obtain habeas corpus relief under an
“extraordinarily high” standard if evidence establishes that he is “unquestionably” innocent.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315–17 (1995). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006)
(“House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in Herrera.”).
88. Leonel Herrera, THE DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/leonel-herrera [http://perma.cc/GZ5U-6S9S].
89. Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority To Grant Habeas
Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421 (2004).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 421–22.
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The Missouri Attorney’s General argument in Amrine was grounded in
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Herrera. Noting that much of Herrera’s
reasoning was driven by the federalism concerns that limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts, the Missouri Supreme Court in an opinion authored by the late
Honorable Rick Teitelman, declined to follow Herrera in determining the
reach of Missouri’s habeas corpus remedy:
In other words, as Herrera recognized, even if a federal court were found not
to have jurisdiction to review a state conviction and sentence in the absence of
a federal constitutional issue, this would not deprive a state court from
reviewing the conviction and sentence if its own state habeas law so permitted.
The issue now before this Court, then, is whether, in the words of Herrera,
Missouri has left a “state avenue open to process such a claim.” This Court
finds that it has done so. Having recognized the prospect of an intolerable
93
wrong, the state has provided a remedy.

The court noted that the federal courts’ Schlup analysis “did not consider
Amrine’s other evidence, including the recantations of Russell and Ferguson,
because that evidence was not new,” and that “[t]his Court is the first forum in
which all of the existing evidence of innocence will be considered.” 94
On the same body of evidence that had been presented to, but ignored by,
the federal courts, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Amrine “has met his
burden of providing clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence that
undermines our confidence in the correctness of the judgment,” and therefore
was entitled to habeas corpus relief. 95 In so holding, the court noted that it is
not “required to impose as high a standard as would a federal court in
reviewing a freestanding claim of actual innocence, for, as discussed, this
Court is not affected by the federalism concerns that limit the federal courts’
jurisdiction to consider non-constitutional claims of actual innocence.” 96 Given
the systemic deficiencies in Missouri’s public defender system, and the
Missouri Attorney’s General apparent indifference to executing or
incarcerating the innocent, the narrow protection that Amrine provides to
prisoners who are clearly actually innocent is essential—even if the trial is
declared to have been “fair.” 97
Yet Missouri continues to struggle with innocence claims. Recently, an
intermediate appellate court declined to apply Amrine to a habeas petitioner
challenging a life sentence. Rodney Lincoln was convicted of a grisly crime—

93. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546–47 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted).
94. Id. at 545.
95. Id. at 548.
96. Id.
97. After reading the opinion in his own case, Amrine himself asked the author, “How can
they say I had a fair trial if I got convicted when I was innocent?”
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the April 1982 murder of JoAnn Tate and the brutal stabbing of her two
daughters, then ages four and seven—based on the identification of the sevenyear-old, corroborated only by a microscopic hair comparison “matching”
Lincoln to a hair found at the scene of the crime. 98 In 2014, after DNA proved
that the hair did not come from Mr. Lincoln, the Eastern District Court of
Appeals nevertheless denied Lincoln’s DNA motion for release because the
child “never wavered” in her identification of Lincoln. 99
Lincoln subsequently brought a habeas corpus petition supported by
evidence neutralizing all of the state’s evidence. The child witness, now in her
forties, spontaneously reported to the prosecuting attorney that she was
mistaken in her identification of Mr. Lincoln, and explained how she was
manipulated by an exceedingly suggestive identification process. 100 Coupled
with the DNA exclusion, her recantation makes Lincoln’s case factually
indistinguishable from Amrine’s, “in which no credible evidence remains from
the first trial to support the conviction.” 101 The only evidence from Lincoln’s
trial that still stands today is his alibi defense, supported by his family and his
employer, that he left home after a good night’s sleep and arrived at work at
the usual time that morning.
Unfortunately for Lincoln, the court of appeals disavowed its power to
release innocent people. The court interpreted Amrine as recognizing “a
freestanding claim of actual innocence in cases where the death penalty has
been imposed because the prospect of executing an innocent person, in the face
of clear and convincing evidence of innocence, is a manifest injustice.” 102
Oddly, the court did not see incarceration for life for a crime one did not
commit as a manifest injustice. “Until the Supreme Court announces that a
freestanding claim of actual innocence is a recognized basis for securing
habeas relief because either the continued incarceration or eventual execution
of an actually innocent person violates principles of due process, we have no
authority to presume that Missouri’s habeas jurisprudence permits such a claim
in a non-death penalty case.” 103 In other words, clear and convincing evidence

98. Lincoln v. State, 457 S.W.3d 800, 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
99. Id. at 803–04. Evidence withheld by the prosecution established that this assumption was
false. See text infra at notes 104–05.
100. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, WD79854, 2016 WL 5888944, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2016). The victim-witness has sided with Lincoln in his legal efforts to win release. Jennifer
Mann, Victim Recants ID That Put Man in Prison for Mother’s Murder in St. Louis in 1982, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/vic
tim-recants-id-that-put-man-in-prison-for-mother/article_503a9500-b913-5a2f-b655-ff822f62f9
17.html [http://perma.cc/9F4U-5YGF].
101. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 548.
102. In re Lincoln, WL5888944 at *6 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at *8 (emphasis in original).
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of innocence is not a legally adequate ground for habeas corpus relief in
Missouri, according to the court of appeals.
In addition to his free-standing claim of innocence, Lincoln raised a claim
based on the prosecutor’s concealment of evidence that the child had fearfully
pointed to other men, including the prosecutor, and called them the “bad man,”
which is how she referred to her attacker. 104 The prosecutor also failed to
disclose that the child had participated in multiple rehearsals of her testimony,
during which she was coached on where the “bad man” would be seated, and
to remember to refer to the “bad man” as Rodney Lincoln. 105 As in the case of
Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a petitioner must prove that
concealed evidence is material to the outcome of the trial, a standard which is
essentially the same as Strickland’s prejudice prong. 106 Just as Professor White
warned, the malleable and subjective outcome-oriented standard enabled the
court of appeals to conclude that even though the concealed evidence “would
have provided [Lincoln] with even more ammunition to support the line of
questioning in fact undertaken at trial, we are not persuaded that [Lincoln] did
not receive a fair trial in the absence of this supplemental impeachment
material.” 107 Thus, Rodney Lincoln joins Daryl Burton in meeting Schlup’s
actual innocence standard, and yet enduring continued incarcerated because,
based on Strickland’s subjective outcome-based standard, his trial was “fair.”
Apparently there is no equity for innocent Missouri prisoners who are not
sentenced to death, no matter how compelling their evidence is.
As this article is being written, Lincoln and the victim-witness in his case
are asking the Missouri Supreme Court to accept transfer of the case, and to
extend Amrine’s holding to prisoners condemned to die in prison of natural
causes. 108 The question remains whether Missouri Courts have the power to
correct a manifest injustice when it becomes apparent. To a lay person, the
term “manifest injustice,” the cornerstone of Missouri habeas corpus
jurisprudence, should make this a simple question to resolve. It is difficult to

104. Id. at *4. Exhibit 39, Affidavit of Quin C. O’Brien at 1, In re Lincoln, 2016 WL 5888944
(on file with the author).
105. In re Lincoln, WD79854 at *4; Exhibit 9, Rachel King Interim Recording at 10, 13, In re
Lincoln, WL 5888944 (on file with the author); Exhibit 10, Affidavit of David L. Miller at ¶¶ 18–
19, In re Lincoln, 2016 WL 5888944 (on file with the author); Exhibit 39, Affidavit of Quin C.
O’Brien at 2, In re Lincoln, 2016 WL 5888944 (on file with the author).
106. Brady v. Maryland held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). The Court has since decided that the standard for “materiality” under Brady is identical
Strickland’s prejudice prong. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1985).
107. In re Lincoln, WD79854 at *4.
108. Motion for Transfer at 9, 12, State ex rel. Lincoln v. Cassady, SC96083 (Mo. Dec. 7,
2016) (pending).
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imagine a free society in which it is not considered a manifest injustice to
imprison an innocent person.
CONCLUSION
Mistakes do happen. Joe Amrine survived his representation by the public
defender system, but only after enduring seventeen years of hell on death row.
He owes his freedom today to a mountain of effort by volunteer lawyers, law
students, and the generosity of a Kansas City mortgage broker who generously
paid tens of thousands of dollars of litigation expenses for Amrine’s
exoneration. All of this effort would have been for naught but for the vision
and humanity of Judge Rick Teitelman. I met with Joe Amrine to share the
news of the good judge’s passing. Joe shook his head slowly, his eyes
moistened and he said, “They said he was supposed to be blind, but he saw
more than a lot of judges. And he sure saw me. He saw me.” Hopefully Judge
Teitelman’s important contribution to Missouri habeas corpus jurisprudence in
the Amrine case will continue to protect glaring miscarriages of justice such as
Amrine’s, Kidd’s and Lincoln’s.
Where to go from here? I have previously proposed a solution for public
defender funding that seems to have worked well in the federal system: adopt a
mandatory system of parity in which prosecutor and defender caseloads,
resources and salaries are funded equally in proportion to one another. 109
Moderate criminal sanctions so that the destruction of a client’s life is not
always the inevitable consequence of error by appointed counsel. 110 Restore a
role for private counsel in the delivery of indigent defense services as an
essential safety valve for excessive defender workloads. 111 Implement the
American Bar Association’s recommendations for managing a system in crisis,
including recommendations to relax procedural technicalities. 112 And preserve
Rick Teitelman’s vision of justice that gives Missouri courts the power and
duty to correct manifest injustices, including the imprisonment of innocent
people.

109. O’Brien, supra note 4, at 874–77.
110. Id. at 877–78.
111. Id. at 881–83.
112. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, Eight
Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads (August 2009), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_
guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4SC9-UKL5].
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